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ABSTRACT
Network measurements are an important tool in understanding the
Internet. Due to the expanse of the IPv6 address space, exhaustive
scans as in IPv4 are not possible for IPv6. In recent years, several
studies have proposed the use of target lists of IPv6 addresses, called
IPv6 hitlists.
In this paper, we show that addresses in IPv6 hitlists are heavily
clustered. We present novel techniques that allow IPv6 hitlists to
be pushed from quantity to quality. We perform a longitudinal
active measurement study over 6 months, targeting more than 50M
addresses. We develop a rigorous method to detect aliased prefixes,
which identifies 1.5 % of our prefixes as aliased, pertaining to about
half of our target addresses. Using entropy clustering, we group the
entire hitlist into just 6 distinct addressing schemes. Furthermore,
we perform client measurements by leveraging crowdsourcing.
To encourage reproducibility in network measurement research
and to serve as a starting point for future IPv6 studies, we publish
source code, analysis tools, and data.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet scanning has a rich history of generating insights for secu-
rity, topology, routing, and many other fields. Advances in software
and link speeds in recent years allow the entire IPv4 Internet to
be easily scanned in just a few minutes [2, 24, 42]. However, scan-
ning the expanse of the entire IPv6 Internet is infeasible due to
its size, which is magnitudes above both what can technically be
sent or stored, and what is an ethical volume of queries to be sent
to a system or network. Therefore, state-of-the-art IPv6 Internet
scanning resorts to the methods used in the early days of IPv4
Internet scanning, i.e., using lists of target IP addresses, so-called
hitlists, which served as a representative subset of the IPv4 address
space [19, 21, 27].
The IPv6 address space also comes with unique, different chal-
lenges to such hitlists. First, hitlists can be biased (i.e., not represen-
tative of the Internet as a whole) due to imbalanced Autonomous
System (AS) and prefix representations or IP address aliasing. Sec-
ond, due to similarly large allocation sizes, a single network—or
even a single machine1—can easily overwhelm a hitlist with count-
less IP addresses. Third, addresses might be used only for very
brief periods of time, as there is no pressure for re-use. Thus, a
key quality of IPv6 hitlists is not the count of IP addresses, but
responsiveness and balance over ASes and prefixes. In this paper,
we systematically tackle these challenges by:
Comprehensive Address Discovery: The first step in unbias-
ing a hitlist is creating a comprehensive hitlist, for which we draw IP
addresses from a multitude of state-of-the-art sources, cf. Section 3.
Clustering by Entropy: To discover and understand clusters
in the expanse of the IPv6 space, we leverage entropy analysis of
IPv6 addresses. This helps to determine addressing schemes and
aggregate clusters, which we explore in Section 4.
De-Aliasing: To reduce the potential impact of aliased prefixes—
i.e., a single machine responding to all addresses in a possibly large
prefix—we postulate and implement a rigorous method for aliased
prefix detection, which we present in Section 5.
Longitudinal Stability Probing: To find reliably responsive
addresses, we conduct longitudinal scans for our hitlist across sev-
eral protocols. As expected, we find only a fraction of discovered
1We have indeed seen a web server responding to an entire /32 prefix, i.e., 296 addresses.
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IP addresses to actually respond to probing, which is an important
filtering criterion for curation of an unbiased hitlist (cf. Section 6).
Diversifying Address Population:We also evaluate three or-
thogonal methods to push the frontier of IPv6 hitlists: generating
addresses using Entropy/IP [33] and 6Gen [56] (in Section 7), lever-
aging reverse DNS records [29] (in Section 8), and crowdsourcing
client IP addresses (in Section 9).
Plotting for Exploratory Analysis: Visualizing IPv6 datasets
is challenging, as IPv4 approaches, such as describing the entire
address space with a Hilbert curve, do not scale for IPv6. We present
a new plotting technique that works with selective input, e.g., pre-
fixes announced in BGP, instead of visualizing the entire address
space. We explain how to interpret these plots in Section 3, and use
it throughout the paper to give an intuitive view of our data.
Publication and Sharing: Our open sharing of a reliable IPv6
hitlist has already supported various scientific studies [5, 7, 16, 33–
35, 39, 44, 66, 68, 69]. We also publicly share daily snapshots of the
curated and unbiased IPv6 hitlist created in this work.
Throughout our work, we aim to adhere to highest of ethical
standards (cf. Section 10.1), and aim for our work to be fully repro-
ducible. We share code and data at:
https://ipv6hitlist.github.io
2 PREVIOUS WORK
Recent studies find that there are hundreds of million active IPv4
addresses [14, 20, 62, 79]. This densely populated IPv4 space is
well suited for brute-force measurement approaches by scanning
the complete address space [2, 24]. The IPv6 space, however, is
extremely sparse. We survey previous work on targeting the sparse
IPv6 space and compare our work with the state of the art in Table 1.
DNS Techniques: The DNS was long known to be a possible
source for IPv6 addresses [40, 76]. Strowes proposes using the in-
addr.arpa IPv4 rDNS tree to gather names that may be resolved
to IPv6 addresses [73], on an assumption that naming is common
between protocols. This discovered 965 k IPv6 addresses located
in some 5531 ASes, many of which (56.7 %) were responsive. More
recently, Fiebig et al. walked the rDNS tree to obtain 2.8M IPv6
addresses [29, 30]. They did not probe these addresses, leaving the
question of responsiveness open. Borgolte et al. find IPv6 addresses
by NSEC-walking DNSSEC signed reverse zones [17].
Table 1: Comparing this work with four previous works (or-
dered chronologically) based on the followingmetrics: num-
ber of addresses from public sources (#publ.), BGP prefixes
(#pfx.), ASes; addresses fromprivate sources (#priv.); include
client addresses (Cts), perform active probing (Prob.), per-
form aliased prefix detection (APD).
Previous work #publ. #pfx. #ASes #priv. Cts Prob. APD
Gasser et al. [36] 2.7M 5.8 k 8.6 k 149M ✓ ✓ ✗
Foremski et al. [33] 620 k <1001 <1001 3.5G ✓ ✓ ✗
Fiebig et al. [29] 2.8M n/a2 n/a 0 ✓ ✗ ✗
Murdock et al. [56]3 1.0M 2.8 k 2.4 k 0 ✓ ✓ ❍
This work 55.1M 25.5 k 10.9 k 0 ✓ ✓ ✓
1: 15 networks, with few prefixes and ASes. 2: 582 k /64s. 3: Responsive addresses.
In this work, we evaluate the responsiveness of IPv6 rDNS as a
source and find rDNS IPv6 addresses a valuable addition to a hitlist.
Structural Properties: The IPv6 address space may be sparsely
populated, but address plans inside networks tend to indicate struc-
ture. Recent related work leverages the structure of IPv6 addressing
schemes to find new addresses. Ullrich et al. use rule mining to find
a few hundred IPv6 addresses [75]. With Entropy/IP, Foremski et al.
present a machine learning approach which trains on collected IPv6
addresses to build an addressing scheme model and generate new
addresses [33]. In this work, we refine Entropy/IP to generate IPv6
addresses for probing, and we introduce a new entropy clustering
technique. Similar to efforts leveraging dense address areas in IPv4
[47], Murdock et al. presented 6Gen to find dense regions in the
IPv6 address space and generate neighboring addresses [56]. In
this work, we use 6Gen to generate addresses based on our hitlist
and compare its performance with Entropy/IP. Murdock et al. also
performed a basic variant of aliased prefix detection (APD), which
we extend in this work. Plonka and Berger harness the structure
from IPv6 address plans to allow large datasets to be shared [59].
Hitlists: Gasser et al. [36] assemble a hitlist from a multitude of
sources. The vast majority of their 149M IPv6 addresses, however,
are obtained from non-public passive sources. We build upon their
approach, but exclusively use publicly available sources in order to
make our work reproducible. Recently, Beverly et al. analyze the
IPv6 topology using large-scale traceroutes, leveraging Gasser et
al.’s public hitlist among other sources [16].
Crowdsourcing: There are a few studies that have leveraged
crowdsourcing platforms to perform network measurements [45,
50, 77]. We build on prior work by Huz et al. [45], who used the
Amazon Mechanical Turk platform to test broadband speeds and
IPv6 adoption. Compared to Huz et al.’s 38 IPv6 addresses collected
in 2015, we find many more.
3 IPV6 HITLIST SOURCES
We leverage a variety of sources, for which we provide an overview
in Table 2. Our guiding principle in selecting sources was that they
should be public, i.e., accessible to anyone for free, in order to make
our work reproducible and to allow fellow researchers to deploy
variations of our IPv6 hitlist. We consider data with an open and
usually positive access decision process as public, such as Verisign’s
process to access zone files. We also aim to have balanced sources,
which include servers, routers, and a share of clients. The sources
we leverage are as follows:
Domain Lists: Described in [7, 35, 66], with a total of 212M
domains from various large zones, resolved for AAAA records
on a daily basis, yielding about 9.8M unique IP addresses. This
source also includes domains extracted from blacklists provided by
Spamhaus [72], APWG [10], and Phishtank [58], which leverage
8.5M, 376 k, and 170 k domains, respectively.
FDNS: A comprehensive set of forward DNS (FDNS) ANY
lookups performed by Rapid7 [61], yielding 2.5M unique addresses.
CT: DNS domains extracted from TLS certificates logged in
Certificate Transparency (CT), and not already part of domain lists,
which yields another 16.2M addresses.
AXFR and TLDR: IPv6 addresses obtained from DNS zone
transfers (AXFR) from the TLDR project [53] and our own AXFR
Clusters in the Expanse: Understanding and Unbiasing IPv6 Hitlists IMC ’18, October 31-November 2, 2018, Boston, MA, USA
Table 2: Overview of hitlist sources, as of May 11, 2018.
Name Public Nature IPs new IPs #ASes #PFXes Top AS1 Top AS2 Top AS3
DL: Domain Lists1 Yes Servers 9.8M 9.8M 6.1 k 10.3 k 89.7 %★ 2.0 %● 1.5 %■
FDNS: Rapid7 FDNS Yes Servers 3.3M 2.5M 7.7 k 13.6 k 16.7 %★ 8.9 %▲ 6.7 %✣
CT: Domains from CT logs2 Yes Servers 18.5M 16.2M 5.3 k 8.7 k 92.3 %★ 1.6 %✣ 0.8 %★
AXFR: AXFR&TLDR Yes Mixed 0.7M 0.5M 3.2 k 4.7 k 57.0 %★ 14.0 %● 8.3 %■
BIT: Bitnodes Yes Mixed 31 k 27 k 695 1.4 k 8.0 %★ 6.0 %■ 6.0 %▲
RA: RIPE Atlas3 Yes Routers 0.2M 0.2M 8.4 k 19.1 k 6.6 %✣ 3.5 %★ 3.1 %✣
Scamper – Routers 26.0M 25.9M 6.3 k 9.8 k 38.9 %★ 23.8 %● 12.0 %■
Total 58.5M 55.1M 10.9 k 25.5 k 45.4 %★ 18.4 %★ 11.5 %●
1: Zone Files, Toplists, Blacklists (partially with NDA); 2: Excluding DNS names already included in Domain Lists; 3: Traceroute and ipmap data
★Amazon, ●Host Europe, ■Cloudflare,▲Linode, ✣DTAG, ★ProXad, ●Hetzner, ■Comcast,▲Swisscom, ✣Google, ★Antel, ●Versatel, ■BIHNET
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(c) Hitlist addresses mapped to 56 k BGP prefixes.
Figure 1: Hitlist sources runup, AS distribution as CDF, and zesplot.
transfers. Obtained domain names are also resolved for AAAA
records daily. This source yields 0.5M unique IPv6 addresses.
Bitnodes: To gather client IPv6 addresses, we use the Bitnodes
API [78], that provides current peers of the Bitcoin network. Al-
though this is the smallest source, contributing 27 k unique IPv6
addresses, we still find it valuable as it also adds client addresses.
RIPE Atlas: We extract all IPv6 addresses found in RIPE At-
las traceroutes, as well as all IPv6 addresses from RIPE’s ipmap
project [63], which adds another 0.2M addresses. These are highly
disjoint from previous sources, likely due to their nature as routers.
Scamper: Finally, we run traceroute measurements using scam-
per [51] on all addresses from other sources, and extract router IP
addresses learned from these measurements. This source shows a
very strong growth characteristic, with 25.9M unique IP addresses.
We accumulate all sources, i.e., IP addresses will stay indefinitely
in our scanning list. We may revisit this decision in the future, and
remove IP addresses after a certain window of unresponsiveness.
Address Runup: Figure 1a shows the cumulative runup of
sources over time. First, we can see a strong growth of IPv6 ad-
dresses in all sources: typically an increase by factors of 10–100
over the course of a year. Second, DNS-based sources—likely reveal-
ing server addresses—together with traceroute addresses obtained
from scamper dominate the overall dataset. As we find scamper’s
explosive growth peculiar, we conduct a closer investigation, which
reveals that 90.7 % of those IP addresses are SLAAC addresses, i.e.,
marked by ff:fe. The vendor codes in MAC addresses gained from
those routers indicate that they are typically home routers: 47.9 %
ZTE and 47.7 % AVM (Fritzbox), followed by 1.2 % Huawei with a
long tail of 240 other vendors. This shows that our source includes
mainly home routers and CPE equipment. Depending on the type of
study, it may be desirable to include or exclude these CPE devices.
zesplot: To explore these large amounts of data, we present
visualizations called zesplots. A zesplot visualizes IPv6 prefixes,
each represented as a rectangle. It does not show the entire IPv6
address space, only the prefixes provided as input. It uses a space-
filling algorithm based on squarified tree-maps [18], extended with
recursive properties. It starts out by filling a vertical row with
rectangles, then a horizontal row, then a vertical row again, and so
on. The prefixes are ordered based on {prefix-size,ASN}, so that large
prefixes are plotted in the top-left corner of the graph, and smaller
prefixes in the bottom-right corner, keeping similarly sized prefixes
from the same AS adjacent. Consequently, a prefix will be in the
same spot in different zesplots, as long as the input prefixes are the
same. Axes have no meaning in a zesplot. More-specific subprefixes
are plotted in the top half of that prefix’s rectangle (a prefix with
many more-specifics might result in a gray rectangle when zoomed-
out). Awhite rectanglemeans no addresses are present in that prefix.
For example, in Figure 1c, we find a bright red /19 in the top-left, /32s
around the center of the plot, and very specific prefixes like /127s
in the bottom-right part. In addition to the list of prefixes, the tool
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(a) Fingerprints of full addresses, F932.
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(b) Fingerprints of IIDs, F1732.
Figure 2: /32 prefixes clustered using entropy fingerprints.
takes a list of addresses, and colors the prefix rectangles based on the
number of addresses that belong to that prefix. With these colors,
one can quickly spot prefixeswhich are possibly over-represented in
the dataset, or verify certain assumptions (e.g., larger prefixes cover
more addresses than smaller prefixes). Depending on the dataset,
an unsized zesplot might provide extra insights on e.g., clusters of
prefixes: in these plots, all rectangles are equivalently sized, and the
prefix size is only used for sorting. We publish the zesplot tool [43]
aiming at more applications in measurement research.
Input Distribution:When evaluating the AS distribution for
each source in Figure 1b, we see stark differences, e.g., for domain-
lists and CT only a handful of ASes make up a large fraction of
addresses, compared to the more balanced RIPE Atlas source. In
addition, we analyze the distribution of hitlist addresses to BGP
prefixes using zesplot in Figure 1c. We cover half of all announced
BGP prefixes, but we find that some prefixes contain unusually
large numbers of addresses, which we investigate in Section 5.
Comparison with DNSDB: Our hitlist covers 12.9 % of IPv6
addresses, 69.4 % of ASes, and 48.7 % of BGP prefixes belonging to
AAAA records stored in DNSDB [28]. The majority of “missing”
addresses belong to large CDN operators, which is probably due to
DNSDB collecting passive DNS data globally, versus active probing
from a few locations. Moreover, the majority of addresses in our
hitlist are not in DNSDB, especially for infrastructure of ISP opera-
tors. We find our hitlist and DNSDB to be complementary. We do
not add DNSDB to our sources as it is not publicly available.
Going Beyond: Besides the aforementioned daily scanned
sources, we also conduct in-depth case studies on three disjunct
input sources: newly learned IPv6 addresses using 6Gen and En-
tropy/IP in Section 7, rDNS-walked IPv6 addresses in Section 8, and
crowdsourced client IPv6 addresses in Section 9.
4 ENTROPY CLUSTERING
We introduce a method for grouping IPv6 networks by similar
entropy in their addresses and evaluate it on our IPv6 hitlist.
Let S be a set of IPv6 addresses in a particular network, e.g., a /32
prefix, a BGP prefix, or an AS. The set may be a random sample, but
with at least 100 addresses. We introduce the following notation:
S = { A1, · · · ,Ai , · · · ,An }, n ≥ 100 (1)
Ai = ( x i1, · · · ,x ij , · · · ,x i32 ), (2)
x ij ∈ Ω = {‘0‘, · · · , ‘f ‘}, (3)
where Ai is an address in that network: a sequence of 32 nybbles,
i.e., hex characters. Let X j be a discrete random variable on Ω
representing nybble j across S , and have an empirical probability
mass function Pˆ(X j ). Next, we compute the normalized Shannon
entropy of X j , which we call an entropy fingerprint Fab :
Fab = ( H (Xa ), · · · ,H (X j ), · · · ,H (Xb ) ) (4)
H (X j ) = 14 · −
∑
ω ∈Ω
Pˆ(X j = ω) · loдPˆ(X j = ω). (5)
where a and b are the first and the last considered nybbles, respec-
tively. Note that ifH (X j ) = 0, then nybble j is constant; ifH (X j ) = 1,
then all its values are equally probable.
We repeat the above for each network, obtaining a dataset of
fingerprints. Next, we run the k-means algorithm on the obtained
dataset to find clusters of networks with similar fingerprints. We
use the well-known elbow method to find the number of clusters,
k , plotting the sum of squared errors (SSE) for k = {1, · · · , 20}:
SSE(k) =
∑
c ∈Ck
∑
E∈c
d2(E, c) (6)
where Ck is the set of clusters obtained for given k , c is the cluster
mean, and d2 is the squared Euclidean distance. We select the k for
which we see an “elbow” in the plot, i.e., the point where increasing
k does not yield a relatively large reduction in SSE.
Finally, we summarize each cluster graphically with its median
entropy on each nybble and with its relative popularity.
4.1 Results
We present the results of entropy clustering on /32 prefixes in our
hitlist in Figure 2, for two different fingerprint lengths. Each plot
shows cluster popularity on the left-hand side, and the median
entropy of each nybble on the right-hand side. Clusters are repre-
sented by rows, ordered top-down by their popularity.
Most notably, in Figure 2a, we identify just 6 clusters of full
address fingerprints. The most popular cluster has entropy ≈ 0 on
all nybbles but a few at the end of network and interface identi-
fiers (IIDs). It is likely an artifact of a common practice to treat
these parts of IPv6 addresses as simple counters. The second most
popular pattern is similar, but uses more nybbles and introduces
more structure. In cluster 3, we see prefixes with pseudo-random
IIDs, manifested in high entropy, which makes predicting addresses
in such networks impossible. Finally, we see MAC-based IIDs in
clusters 5 and 6, where nybbles 23-26 are likely just ff:fe.
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(a) /32 prefixes with addresses responding to UDP/53, clustered us-
ing entropy fingerprints of full addresses, F932.
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Figure 3: Entropy clustering for DNS responsive hosts and cluster distribution in BGP prefixes.
In Figure 2b, we focus on IIDs only, i.e., we limit fingerprints
to nybbles 17-32, and find just 4 clusters. Again, the majority of
evaluated networks use IIDs as counters, as visible in clusters 1 and
2. This is expected and common, e.g., for pools of servers, but shows
potential for probabilistic scanning. We see the impact of SLAAC
in clusters 3 and 4: pseudo-random and MAC-based, respectively.
Finally, we use entropy clustering throughout the paper to help
with the interpretation of our results. First, we try to better under-
stand the IPv6 scanning results detailed in Section 6. In Figure 3a,
we present clusters with addresses that respond to a UDP/53 (DNS)
scan. We find that most clusters exhibit low entropy on all but a
few nybbles. This phenomenon makes probabilistic scanning for
IPv6 DNS servers easy, which we demonstrate in Section 7.
In Figure 3b, we show how clusters are distributed to BGP pre-
fixes. The prefixes are ordered by their length and origin AS, but
the box size is static instead of based on the prefix length, which
helps in pattern spotting. We plot only prefixes belonging to ASes
with more than 100 addresses. With the order running from top-left
(larger prefixes) to bottom-right (smaller prefixes), we find that the
mix of clusters is more heterogeneous for larger prefixes. Within
the smaller prefixes, we observe greater consistency. Most of the
large, equally colored chunks are equally sized prefixes in a single
AS. This hints at operators using the same addressing scheme, or
deploying equivalent equipment or setups, in their prefixes.
4.2 Discussion
Wehighlight that entropy clustering is different fromEntropy/IP [33].
Although both algorithms use Shannon entropy, our method finds
high-level patterns across networks, whereas Entropy/IP finds low-
level patterns within a network. However, the methods are com-
plementary: for instance, entropy clustering can help in spotting
networks susceptible to probabilistic scanning, while Entropy/IP
can generate a hitlist for each of them.
We also stress that entropy clustering is not confined to /32
prefixes, or to the fingerprint lengths we presented in the paper.
Note that /32 prefixes are commonly the smallest blocks assigned to
IPv6 networks [3, 9, 11, 48, 64]. Using different entropy clustering
parameters allows the different particularities of IPv6 deployment
to be investigated. We provide supplemental results obtained from
clustering based on ASes, BGP prefixes, and other fingerprints
online. Similarly, using other clustering tools will lead to different
results. We present a baseline set of parameters and tools based on
common practice, leaving other options for future work.
In summary, entropy clustering is a new technique that simplifies
Internet studies. Instead of treating IPv6 as an opaque and expansive
addressing space, we can visualize actual addressing patterns and
their popularity in one picture. Our results have implications for
scanning the IPv6 Internet. For instance, the clusters in Figure 2
suggest people in general use IPv6 addresses in a limited number
of ways, and that many IPv6 address nybbles are easy to predict.
On the other hand, cluster popularities represent our hitlist—and to
some extent, IPv6 hitlists in general—rather than the Internet.
5 ALIASED PREFIX DETECTION
Aliased network prefixes, i.e., prefixes under which each possible
IP address replies to queries, were already found when conducting
IPv4 measurements [6]. For IPv6 measurements, however, aliased
prefixes pose a much more significant challenge as they can easily
contribute vast numbers of addresses that map to the same server,
e.g., through the IP_FREEBIND option in Linux. This feature is
already in use by CDNs [52], and was identified as a challenge in
previous works [29, 56]. Aliased prefixes can artificially inflate the
number of IP addresses within a hitlist (e.g., enumerating a /96
prefix can add 232 addresses), and introduce significant bias into
any studies using these hitlists. Given this, we want to populate
our hitlist only with valuable addresses, i.e., addresses belonging
to different hosts and having balanced prefix and AS distributions.
This requires reliable detection and removal of aliased prefixes, for
which we introduce a rigorous method in the following.
Similar to [29, 56], our method has its roots in the concept that
a randomly selected IP address in the vast IPv6 space is unlikely
to respond. Thus, when probing randomly selected addresses, a
prefix can be classified as aliased after a certain number of replies
have been received. Murdock et al. [56] send three probes each
to three random addresses in every /96 prefix. Upon receipt of
replies from all three random addresses, the prefix is determined as
aliased. In the following, we describe how we improve efficiency
and effectiveness of this approach in several ways.
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Table 3: Example of IPv6 fan-out for multi-level aliased pre-
fix detection. We generate one pseudo-random address in
2001:0db8:407:8000::/64 for each of the 16 subprefixes, i.e.,
2001:0db8:407:8000:[0-f]/68.
2001:0db8:0407:8000::/64
2001:0db8:0407:8000:0151:2900:77e9:03a8
2001:0db8:0407:8000:181c:4fcb:8ca8:7c64
2001:0db8:0407:8000:23d1:5e8e:3453:8268
.
.
.
2001:0db8:0407:8000:f693:2443:915e:1d2e
Alias detection needs to fulfill two criteria to scale: (1) detection
must be low-bandwidth, with a small number of packets required
per network, (2) detection must function for end hosts, not only
routers, which excludes many alias detection techniques.
5.1 Multi-Level Aliased Prefix Detection
For our daily scans, we perform multi-level aliased prefix detection
(APD), i.e., detection at different prefix lengths. This is in contrast
to previous works that use static prefix lengths, e.g., /96.
To determine whether a prefix is aliased, we send 16 packets
to pseudo-random addresses within the prefix, using TCP/80 and
ICMPv6. For each packet we enforce traversal of a subprefix with a
different nybble. For example, to check if 2001:db8:407:8000::/64
is aliased, we generate 1 pseudo-random address for each 4-bit
subprefix, 2001:db8:407:8000:[0-f]000::/68. See Table 3 for a
visual explanation. Using this technique we ensure that (1) probes
are distributed evenly over more specific subprefixes and (2) pseudo-
random IP addresses, which are unlikely to respond, are targeted.
For each probed prefix we count the number of responsive ad-
dresses. If we obtain responses from all 16 probed addresses, we
label the prefix as aliased.
We run the aliased prefix detection on IPv6 addresses that are
either BGP-announced or in our hitlist. The former source allows
us to understand the aliased prefix phenomenon on a global scale,
even for prefixes where we do not have any targets. The latter
source allows us to inspect our target prefixes more in-depth.
For BGP-based probing, we use each prefix as announced, with-
out enumerating additional prefixes. For our hitlist, we map the
contained addresses to all prefixes from 64 to 124, in 4-bit steps. We
limit APD probing to prefixes with more than 100 targets for two
reasons: First, efficiency, as APD probing requires 32 probes (16
for ICMPv6 and TCP/80, respectively). Second, impact, as prefixes
with less than 100 probes can only distort our hitlist in a minor
way. We exempt /64 prefixes from this limitation so as to allow
full analysis of all known /64 prefixes. We use 47.4M probes to
guarantee complete coverage of all /64 prefixes and 49.2M probes
in total.
As we perform target-based APD at several prefix lengths, the
following four cases may occur:
(1) Both more and less specific are aliased
(2) Both more and less specific are non-aliased
(3) More specific aliased, less specific non-aliased
(4) More specific non-aliased, less specific aliased
The first two cases depict the “regular” aliased and non-aliased
behaviors, respectively. The third case is more interesting as we ob-
serve divergent results based on the prefix length that we query. One
example is a /96 prefix which is determined as being non-aliased,
with only 9 out of 16 /100 subprefixes determined as aliased. This
case underlines the need for our fan-out pseudo-random aliased
prefix detection. Using purely random addresses, all 16 could by
chance fall into the 9 aliased subprefixes, which would then lead
to incorrectly labeling the entire /96 prefix as aliased. The fourth
case is an anomaly, since an aliased prefix should not have more
specific non-aliased subprefixes. One reason for this anomaly is
packet loss for subprefix probes, incorrectly labeling the subprefix
as non-aliased.
We analyze how common the fourth case is in our results and
investigate the reasons. On May 4, 2018, we detect only eight such
cases at the prefix lengths /80, /116, and /120:
The /80 prefix shows 3 to 5 out of the 16 possible responses
over time. The branches of responding probes differ between days,
with no discernible pattern. We suspect this prefix is behind a
SYN proxy [25], which is activated only after a certain threshold
of connection attempts is reached. Once active, the SYN proxy
responds to every incoming TCP SYN, no matter the destination.
The /116 prefix consistently shows 15 out of 16 probes being
answered on consecutive days, even though a less specific prefix
was classified as aliased. Moreover, the 15 probes answer with the
same TCP options on consecutive days. The non-responding probe
is always on the 0x0 branch, so we believe the subprefix is handled
differently and not by an aliased system. In fact, comparing the paths
of the different branches reveals that the 0x0 branch is answered
by an address in a different prefix. The DNS reverse pointer of this
address hints at a peering router at DE-CIX in Frankfurt, Germany.
This /116 anomaly underlines the importance of the multi-level
aliased prefix detection, since there are in fact small non-aliased
subprefixes within aliased less specific prefixes.
The case of six neighboring /120 prefixes manifests less consis-
tently than the previously described phenomenon. The branches
that lack responses change from day to day, as well as from prefix
to prefix. Subsequent manual measurements show that previously
unresponsive branches become responsive. The root cause is most
likely ICMP rate limiting, which explains the seemingly random
responding branches. We try to counter packet and ICMP-rate
limiting loss as explained in Section 5.2.
After the APD probing, we perform longest-prefix matching to
determine whether a specific IPv6 address falls into an aliased prefix
or not. This ensures we use the result of the most closely covering
prefix for each IPv6 address, which creates an accurate filter for
aliased prefixes. If a target IP address falls into an aliased prefix, we
remove it from that day’s ZMapv6 and scamper scans.
5.2 Loss Resilience
Packet loss might cause a false negative, i.e., an aliased prefix being
incorrectly labeled as non-aliased. To increase resilience against
packet loss, we apply (1) cross-protocol response merging and (2) a
multi-day sliding window.
As we are probing all 16 target addresses on ICMPv6 and TCP/80,
IP addresses may respond inconsistently. Our technique hinges
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Table 4: Impact of sliding window on unstable prefix count.
Sliding window 0 1 2 3 4 5
Unstable prefixes 65 26 22 14 14 13
100 101 102 103 104
Prefix/AS for all and non-aliased IPs
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Figure 4: Prefix and AS distribution for aliased, non-aliased,
and all hitlist addresses.
on the fact that it is unlikely for a randomly chosen IP address
to respond at all, so we treat an address as responsive even if it
replies to only the ICMPv6 or the TCP/80 probe. While this greatly
stabilizes our results, we still see high-loss networks, which would
fail automatic detection, but could be manually confirmed as aliased.
To further tackle these, we introduce a sliding window over
several past days, and require each IP address to have responded to
any protocol in the past days. As prefixes may change their nature,
we perform this step very carefully, and aim for a very short sliding
window to react to such changes as quickly as possible.
To find an optimum, we compare the number of days in the
sliding window to the number of prefixes that are unstable, i.e.,
change the nature of stable and unstable over several days. We show
the data in Table 4, which confirms that with a sliding window of
just 3 days, we can reduce the number of unstable prefixes by almost
80 %, while only adding a small delay for prefixes that change their
nature. With the final sliding window of 3 days, only 14 of the 909
aliased prefixes as of May 1, 2018 show an unstable nature.
5.3 Impact of De-Aliasing
We apply the aliased prefix detection (APD) filtering daily and an-
alyze the impact on our hitlist for May 11, 2018. Before filtering,
there are a total of 55.1M IPv6 addresses on our hitlist. After iden-
tifying aliased prefixes, 29.4M targets (53.4 %) remain. With the
unfiltered hitlist we cover 10,866 ASes and 25,465 announced pre-
fixes. Removing aliased prefixes reduces our AS coverage by only
13 ASes, and lowers prefix coverage by 3.2 % to 24,648 prefixes.
We show the AS and prefix distribution for aliased, non-aliased,
and all IPv6 addresses in Figure 4. By comparing AS distributions we
find aliased prefixes as heavily centered on a single AS (Amazon). In
consequence, the AS distribution for non-aliased prefixes is flatter
than the population as a whole. The picture changes for prefix
distributions: targets in non-aliased prefixes are now slightly more
top-heavy compared to the general population. One of the reasons
is that the vast majority of aliased IP addresses are within 189 /48
prefixes announced by Amazon, which are the shortest detected
aliased prefixes. This results in shifting down the prefix distribution
of the general population.
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(a) 16 k prefixes without aliased prefix detection.
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(b) 461 (3.0% of 16 k) detected aliased prefixes.
Figure 5: Responses to ICMP Echo requests.
To further visualize the effect of filtering aliased prefixes, we
compare Figure 5a with Figure 5b. In these figures, equally sized
boxes are plotted for every prefix, ordered by prefix length and ASN.
We find that aliasing barely occurs in the shortest prefixes, plotted
in the top left corner of the plot. Towards the lower right end—i.e.,
the longer prefixes—we find some groups of aliased /32 prefixes,
but most eye-catching are the groups forming the big “hook”. These
are all /48 prefixes, with the majority belonging to Amazon (the
“outer” hook) and Incapsula (the “inner” hook). We also see that
filtering these prefixes is effective: the brightly colored Amazon
aliased prefixes comprise a large share of the input set.
5.4 Fingerprinting Aliased Prefixes
The reason for not scanning aliased prefixes is that each contained
IP address is assumed to belong to the same host, and consequently
to display the same properties.We investigate this assumption by de-
ploying fingerprinting techniques in our probes. Employing a ZMap
module that supports the TCP Options header [65], we send a set
of commonly supported fingerprinting options (MSS-SACK-TS-WS),
setting MSS and WS to 1 to trigger differing replies [68].
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Fingerprinting is a fuzzy and challenging technique, which is
why we carefully evaluate results and consider them indicative
rather than conclusive. We consider this as a case study for valida-
tion, and do not feed the results back to scanning.
Below, we investigate replies from 20,692 /64 prefixes classified
as aliased, for which all of our 16 APD probes to TCP/80 succeeded
on May 11, 2018. We first analyze TTL values of response packets.
Previous work found that TTL values cannot be expected to be
constant per prefix or even IP address [13, 67]. TTL inconsistencies
can stem from routing changes, TTL-manipulating middleboxes, or
other on-path effects. We quickly re-appraise this sentiment with
our data, and can confirm that 5970 of our 20,692 prefixes offer
inconsistent TTL values. We hence replace the raw TTL metric
with the likely initial TTL (iTTL) value chosen by a host.
iTTL: Rounding the TTL value up to the next power of 2 re-
sults in the iTTL value [13, 46, 55]. Using iTTL, we find only 6
prefixes with inconsistent behavior, all caused by 22 IP addresses
responding with differing iTTL values to our 2 consecutive probes.
These addresses belong to only 2 /48 prefixes, announced by 2 not
commonly known ASes. As the iTTL can be only one of four values
(32, 64, 128, or 255), we use differing iTTL as a negative indicator
for APD: many different iTTL values suggest a non-aliased prefix.
With only 0.03 % of inconsistent prefixes, we remain confident in
our APD filtering.
Optionstext: We next evaluate a metric used by [15, 68] that
translates TCP options into a string, which preserves the order of
options and padding bytes, but not the option values. For example,
the string MSS-SACK-TS-N-WS would represent a packet that set
the Maximum Segment Size, Selective ACK, Timestamps, a padding
byte, and Window Scale options. Although we found 99.5 % of re-
sponsive hosts to choose that set of options, we identify 104 prefixes
that return differing sets of TCP options, an unlikely behavior for a
prefix aliased to the same machine.
WScale and WSize: The next metric is TCP window size and
TCP window scale option. These options are also not necessarily
expected to stay constant, as changes in host state can lead to
advertising varying window sizes. However, a consistent window
across all IP addresses in a prefix again raises our confidence in our
technique. We find 1068 prefixes with inconsistent TCP window
sizes, and 105 prefixes with inconsistent window scale options: a
sizable number, but amounting to only ≈ 5 % of our aliased prefixes.
MSS: Like iTTL, the TCP Maximum Segment Size is used as
a negative indicator. Inconsistent MSS values are determined for
1030 prefixes. This behavior is, as for previous metrics, typically
caused by individual IP addresses sending differing MSS sizes.
Timestamps: Finally, we evaluate TCP Timestamps, as sug-
gested by [15, 68]. Although TCP Timestamps offer highly discrimi-
native features, they cannot reliably identify a prefix as non-aliased
with only 2 probes per host, due to the variety of possible behav-
iors, e.g., randomized start values. They can, however, strengthen
our confidence that an aliased prefix is behaving consistently. We
hence run the following checks: (1) whether all hosts send the same
(or missing) timestamps, (2) whether timestamps are monotonic
for the whole prefix, and (3) whether the receive timestamp and
remote TCP timestamp have a regression coefficient R2 > 0.8. This
tests for a global linear counter, strongly hinting that the queried IP
addresses belong to the same machine [15, 68]. If any of these three
Table 5: Fingerprinting 20.7 k aliased prefixes: inconsistent
prefixes per test, in total, and total consistent.
Test Incs. Σ Incs. ΣCons.
iTTL 6 6 20,686
Optionstext 104 110 20,581
WScale 105 215 19,515
MSS 1030 1175 19,513
WSize 1068 1186 19,506
Timestamps n/a1 n/a1 13,202
1A failed timestamping test does not indicate
an inconsistent prefix, but an indecisive one.
Table 6: Validation: aliased prefixes are considerably less in-
consistent and pass many more consistency checks, includ-
ing timestamping.
Scan type Incons. Cons. Indec.
Non-aliased prefixes 50.4 % 23.8 % 25.8 %
Aliased prefixes 5.1 % 63.8 % 31.1 %
tests succeeds, we consider a prefix to offer consistent behavior,
which is a strong indicator for aliasing.
We find 13,202 of the 20,692 prefixes to exhibit a consistent
behavior. Given that all Linux machines since kernel 4.10 would
fail our tests as they randomize initial timestamps per <SRC-IP,
DST-IP> tuple [68], we consider this to be a quite high indicator
that our APD probing does indeed find aliased IP addresses. Note
that due to many valid scenarios, a failed timestamping test does not
make a prefix inconsistent, but is simply indecisive as to whether a
prefix may or may not be aliased.
Table 5 shows statistics for all performed consistency tests. Ex-
cluding TCP Timestamps, all tests combined find only 1186 incon-
sistent prefixes. Interestingly, > 90 % of those are caused by hosts
showing surprisingly inconsistent behavior to our 2 probe pack-
ets. For example, we found 22 hosts responding with distinctively
different iTTL values (64 vs. 255) in direct order. We also see hosts
responding with different sets of TCP options or option values.
Many of these are hosted at CDNs, and might be TCP-level proxies
to other services, which could explain time-variant fingerprints.
Validation: To verify our methodology, we run the same tests
on prefixes considered non-aliased after several days of APD. For
direct comparison, we only choose 2940 /64 prefixes with ≥16 re-
sponding IP addresses. As shown in Table 6, we find 1481 (50.4 %)
to fail at least one of our tests, a considerably higher share than the
5.1 % among aliased prefixes. Additionally, we find only 699 prefixes
(23 %) to pass our high-confidence test of consistent timestamping
behavior, compared to 63.8 % in aliased prefixes.
Looking deeper into the 699 allegedly non-aliased prefixes that
pass our high-confidence test, we find 99 where the whole prefix
sends the same TCP timestamp, 509 with strictly monotonic times-
tamp behavior, and 91 passing our R2 test. As same and strictly
monotonic TCP timestamps are unlikely to happen by chance, we
investigate why those prefixes were not detected as aliased. We
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find two root causes which can cause this scenario: (1) prefixes may
be aliased at subprefixes longer than /64, which we only probe if
more than 100 IP addresses are responsive in that prefix—only 167
of the 699 prefixes qualified for probing longer subprefixes than /64.
(2) prefixes may contain many IPv6 addresses specifically bound
to one machine, but without binding the full prefix to the machine.
This would cause a set of our random probes to fail, and hence the
prefix would be detected as not aliased. We consider the remaining
167 prefixes to fall in this category.
From this deep-dive, we conclude that those 699 prefixes that
pass our timestamping test are indeed highly likely to have all their
active IP addresses bound to the same machine, but without rep-
resenting >100 IP addresses (532 prefixes), or without binding the
full prefix (167 prefixes). Therefore, our APD detection algorithm
does not detect these as aliased. This discrepancy stems from the
facts that (1) our APD, by not probing low-density prefixes, may
give some false negatives, and (2) the “same machine” test in our
validation also holds true for prefixes with many IPv6 addresses
specifically bound to one host, while our APD aims to find prefixes
where all IP addresses are bound to the same host.
As we consider this validation step merely an informative case
study, we do not consider these problematic.
In sum, our validation step shows that (1) our tests are discrimi-
natory and (2) aliased prefixes offer far less diverse configurations,
with many more cases believed to be the same machine.
5.5 Comparison to Murdock et al.’s Approach
In order to assess our APD approach we quantitatively compare it
to Murdock et al.’s [56]. As Murdock et al. perform alias detection
on a best-effort basis by probing addresses in prefixes with a static
prefix length of /96, we expect our approach to find more aliased
prefixes. This is in fact the case as we find 992.6 k hitlist addresses
residing in aliased prefixes which are not detected by Murdock et al.
On the other hand, Murdock et al.’s approach classifies only 1.4 k
hitlist addresses as aliased which we deem non-aliased.
Additionally, we compare the bandwidth requirements of our
APD approach to Murdock et al.’s. As our approach works on
multiple prefix levels where at least 100 targets are present, we
focus on the most likely aliased prefixes. Consequently, we send
probes to a total of 50.1M IPv6 addresses to determine aliased
prefixes in our hitlist. Using Murdock et al.’s static /96 prefixes,
more than twice as many IPv6 addresses (113.8M) are probed.
To summarize, our approach finds 992.6 k more hitlist addresses
in aliased prefixes compared to Murdock et al.’s approach and at
the same time probes less than half the number of IP addresses.
6 ADDRESS PROBING
We generate IPv6 targets and probe these targets’ responsiveness
each day. First, we collect addresses from our hitlist sources. Sec-
ond, we preprocess, merge, and shuffle these addresses in order
to prepare them as input for scanning. Third, we perform aliased
prefix detection to eliminate targets in aliased prefixes. Fourth, we
traceroute all known addresses using scamper [51] to learn ad-
ditional router addresses. Fifth, we use ZMapv6 [74] to conduct
responsiveness measurements on all targets. We send probes on
ICMP, TCP/80, TCP/443, UDP/53, and UDP/443 to cover the most
common services [36]. We repeat this process each day to allow for
longitudinal responsiveness analysis.
6.1 Responsive Addresses
We first evaluate responsive addresses based on their corresponding
BGP prefix.
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Figure 6: All 56 k BGP prefixes, colored based on the number
of responses to ICMP Echo requests on May 11, 2018.
Overall, our hitlist contains 1.9M responsive IPv6 addresses,
spread over 21,647 BGP prefixes covering 9968 different ASes.
Figure 6 shows non-aliased ICMP-responsive addresses per BGP
prefix. We see that most prefixes are covered with dozens to hun-
dreds of responsive targets, whereas a few prefixes contribute 12 k
or more responsive addresses. The plot is, in terms of colors, strik-
ingly similar to the input set visualized in Figure 1c (note however
that the range of the scale in the response plot is smaller). This
tells us that for most of the prefixes in our input set, we indeed
see responses, and only few return no responses at all. A possible
explanation for prefixes with a sizable number of addresses in the
input set ending up blank in the response plot is the dropping of
ICMP echo requests at a border router.
6.2 Cross-protocol Responsiveness
We analyze the cross-protocol responsiveness of our probes, to
understand what kind of IPv6 hosts are responding to our probes.
In Figure 7 we show the conditional probability of responsiveness
between protocols, i.e., if protocol X is responding, how likely is it
that protocol Y will respond. We compare our findings for IPv6 to
Bano et al. [14] who performed a similar analysis for IPv4.
We find that if an IPv6 address responds to any of the probes,
there is at least a 89 % chance of the same IP address also responding
to ICMPv6. The ICMP correlation in IPv6 is higher compared to IPv4,
where we see values as low as 73 %. Since ICMPv6 is an integral
part of IPv6, it should not be simply blocked in firewalls [22], which
makes it more likely that hosts are responding to ICMPv6 compared
to its IPv4 counterpart.
Additionally, we see correlations between UDP/443, TCP/443,
and TCP/80. More specifically, if an address is responsive to QUIC
(UDP/443), it has a likelihood of 98 % to be also providing HTTPS
and HTTP services. HTTPS servers are 91 % likely to provide an
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Figure 7: Conditional probability of responsiveness between
services.
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Figure 8: Responsiveness over time, split up by hitlist source
and, for special cases, also probed protocol.
HTTP service as well, e.g., to offer a forwarding service to the
secure version of a web page. Note that the reverse correlation
(HTTP→ HTTPS→ QUIC) is far less pronounced. Compared to
the HTTPS→ HTTP correlation of 91 % in IPv6, we see only a 72 %
correlation in IPv4 [14].
Analyzing DNS (UDP/53) correlation shows mostly similar re-
sults in IPv6 as in IPv4. One exception is the lower correlation to
HTTPS in IPv6 (54 %) compared to IPv4 (78 %).
6.3 Longitudinal Responsiveness
To analyze address responsiveness over time, we probe an address
continuously even if it disappears from our hitlist’s daily input
sources. We evaluate longitudinal responsiveness over two weeks
as depicted in Figure 8. As a baseline for each source we take all
responsive addresses on the first day.
We find that IPv6 addresses from domain lists (DL), FDNS, and
RIPE Atlas answer quite consistently over the 14 day period, with
all three sources losing only a few percentages of addresses. CT
and AXFR sources overall reach a similarly stable response rate;
their QUIC response rates, however, fluctuate more heavily and are
therefore depicted separately. We investigate this phenomenon and
find that more than 80 % of fluctuating addresses are located in two
prefixes: Akamai and HDNet. We suspect that these companies are
testing the deployment of QUIC on some of their systems or that our
measurements are caught by a rate limiting mechanism, resulting
in flaky response behavior. Moreover, sources which include clients
or CPE devices such as Bitnodes and Scamper lose 20 % and 32 % of
the responding hosts, respectively.
7 LEARNING NEW ADDRESSES
In addition to acquiring IPv6 addresses through domain names and
other sources, we can also detect addressing schemes, and leverage
those patterns to learn previously unknown addresses.
7.1 Methodology
To generate previously unknown addresses, we feed our hitlist into
a re-implementation of Entropy/IP [4, 32, 33], and a pre-release ver-
sion of 6Gen [56]. For this work, we improve the address generator
of Entropy/IP by walking the Bayesian network model exhaustively
instead of randomly. The improved generator lets us focus on more
probable IPv6 addresses, under a constrained scanning budget.
First, we use all addresses in non-aliased prefixes to build a seed
address list. Excluding aliased prefixes avoids generating addresses
in prefixes where all addresses are responsive, and thus artificially
distorting the response rate. Second, we split the seed address list
based on ASes, as we assume similar addressing patterns within
the same AS. We limit the eligible ASes to those with at least 100
IPv6 addresses to increase the probability of 6Gen and Entropy/IP
identifying patterns. Third, we take a random sample of at most
100 k IPv6 addresses per AS to use as input for 6Gen and Entropy/IP.
The capped random sample ensures that we provide a balanced
input for each AS. Fourth, we run Entropy/IP and 6Gen with the
capped random sample as input to generate 1M addresses for each
AS separately. Fifth, we again take a random sample of at most 100 k
of all generated addresses per AS for 6Gen and Entropy/IP, respec-
tively. The capped random sample ensures that ASes with more
generated addresses are not overrepresented. Sixth, we perform
active measurements to assess the value of generated addresses.
7.2 Learned Addresses
Entropy/IP generates 118M addresses. Of those, 116M are routable
new addresses not yet in our hitlist. 6Gen produces slightly more
addresses, 129M, of which 124M are new and routable. In total,
we learn 239M new unique addresses. Interestingly, there is very
little overlap between 6Gen’s and Entropy/IP’s generated addresses:
only 675 k addresses are produced by both tools, which equals to
0.2 % of all generated addresses.
7.3 Responsiveness of Learned Addresses
We probe the responsiveness of all 239M learned addresses on
ICMP, TCP/80, TCP/443, UDP/53, and UDP/443. 785 k IPv6 ad-
dresses respond to our probes, which corresponds to a response rate
of 0.3 %. This low response rate underlines the challenges of finding
new responsive addresses through learning-based approaches.
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Figure 9: Prefix andAS distribution for responsive addresses
generated with 6Gen and Entropy/IP.
Comparing the responsiveness of addresses generated by 6Gen
to Entropy/IP, we find that 6Gen is able to find almost twice as
many responsive addresses: 489 k vs. 278 k. Our response rate for
6Gen is a lower bound: due to 6Gen’s design, choosing the top
generated addresses instead of random sampling would likely yield
an even higher response rate.
In addition, both Entropy/IP and 6Gen found the same 17 k re-
sponsive addresses. The response rate of overlapping addresses
generated by both tools is therefore 2.5 %, which is an order of
magnitude higher than the general learned address population’s
0.3 %. This demonstrates that Entropy/IP and 6Gen find comple-
menting sets of responsive IPv6 addresses, with a small overlap of
targets that are more likely to respond. Thus, it is meaningful to
run multiple address generation tools even on the same set of input
addresses.
Table 7: Top 5 responsive protocol combinations for 6Gen
and Entropy/IP.
ICMP TCP/80 TCP/443 UDP/53 UDP/443 6Gen Entropy/IP
✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 66.8 % 41.1 %
✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ 9.2 % 12.3 %
✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ 7.3 % 23.1 %
✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ 4.9 % 3.4 %
✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ 3.2 % 6.1 %
When analyzing the top 5 protocols for responsive learned ad-
dresses in Table 7, we find particular differences between 6Gen and
Entropy/IP. Two thirds of 6Gen responsive addresses answer to
ICMP only, which is the case for only four out of ten Entropy/IP
responsive addresses. On the other hand, Entropy/IP responsive
hosts are three times more likely to be DNS servers (UDP/53). More-
over, 6Gen responsive hosts are half as likely to be QUIC-enabled
web servers (ICMP, TCP/80, TCP/443, and UDP/443) compared to
Entropy/IP. This shows that 6Gen and Entropy/IP not only dis-
cover mostly non-overlapping addresses, but also different types of
populations of responsive hosts.
Finally, we compare ASes and prefixes of responsive addresses
for both tools. 6Gen discovers responsive hosts in 1442 ASes, while
Entropy/IP does in 1275 ASes. Interestingly, responsive hosts in
384 ASes are found by only one of the tools, i.e., either 6Gen or
Entropy/IP. In Figure 9, we show the prefix and AS distributions of
responsive hosts. Entropy/IP’s distribution is a bit less top-heavy
compared to 6Gen’s, where the top 2 responsive ASes make up
almost 20 % of all addresses. Although there is some overlap in the
top 5 ASes, 6Gen features more ISPs, like Sky Broadband, Google
Fiber, and Xs4all Internet. In contrast, Entropy/IP’s top ASes contain
more CDNs and Internet services.
To summarize, 6Gen and Entropy/IP find few overlapping re-
sponsive addresses, but mostly in overlapping ASes. The services
offered by these hosts differ considerably. Therefore, both tools
have their advantages in finding specific addresses and populations.
We suggest running both tools to maximize the number of found
responsive addresses.
8 RDNS AS A DATA SOURCE
In addition to the sources described in Section 3, we investigate
the usefulness of IPv6 rDNS entries for active measurements. As
shown by previous work, rDNS walking can be a source for IPv6
addresses [29, 30]. While IPv6 rDNS addresses were used to, e.g.,
find misconfigured IPv6 networks [17], we are not aware of studies
evaluating overall responsiveness. Since walking the rDNS tree to
harvest IPv6 addresses is a large effort and puts strain on important
Internet infrastructure, we classify this source as “semi-public”,
compared with sources such as the Alexa Top 1M list, which is
available for download.
We use IPv6 rDNS data provided by Fiebig et al. [30] to perform
active measurements and compare the results against other hitlist
sources. Analyzing the overlap and structure of IPv6 addresses
obtained from rDNS, we find a very small intersection with our
hitlist. Of the 11.7M addresses from rDNS, 11.1M are new. The
prefix distribution of rDNS and hitlist addresses is quite similar,
as shown in Figure 10. The AS distribution is even more balanced
for rDNS addresses compared to the hitlist. Therefore, the addition
of rDNS data to the hitlist input would not introduce a bias at the
prefix or AS level.
Next, we perform active measurements to compare the response
rate of the rDNS population to the hitlist population. Before the
active measurement, we filter 2.1M unrouted addresses and 13.1 k
addresses residing in aliased prefixes (see Section 5) from the rDNS
addresses. The response rate for the hitlist with only non-aliased
prefixes is generally similar to the response rate of rDNS. The rDNS
ICMP response rate is higher: 10 % compared to the hitlist’s 6 %. On
the other hand, we receive slightly fewer HTTP(S) responses for
rDNS, at 2 % (1 %) against the hitlist’s 3 % (2 %).
To ensure that responding rDNS addresses are not mostly client
addresses, we first analyze the top ASes. As can be seen in Table 8,
the top responsive ASes in the rDNS data are hosting and service
providers, i.e., mostly servers (especially in the TCP/80 measure-
ment). Next, we look for IPv6 SLAAC’s distinct ff:fe sequence
and evaluate the hamming weight of IIDs for responsive rDNS ad-
dresses, as an additional indicator for clients. We find between 6 %
and 9 % SLAAC addresses with ff:fe. The IID hamming weight
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Figure 10: Prefix and AS distribution for hitlist and rDNS
input data.
Table 8: Top 5 rDNS ASes in input and responsive via ICMP
and TCP/80.
# Input ICMP TCP/80
1 Comcast 12.5 % Online S.A.S. 19.6 % Google 12.8 %
2 AWeber 10.2 % Sunokman 17.8 % Hetzner 10.1 %
3 Yandex 9.8 % Latnet Serviss 8.7 % Freebit 6.8 %
4 Belpak 6.2 % Yandex 7.9 % Sakura 6.5 %
5 Sunokman 6.1 % Salesforce 5.3 % TransIP 5.0 %
(i.e., number of bits set to 1) can be used to infer the presence of
clients with privacy extensions enabled [36]. The rDNS IID ham-
ming weight does not suggest that the rDNS set contains a large
client population, especially for TCP/80, where 60 % of addresses
have a hamming weight of six or smaller.
To conclude, the responsive part of the rDNS data source adds a
balanced set of IPv6 addresses. We therefore suggest adding rDNS
data as input to the IPv6 hitlist.
9 CLIENT IPV6 ADDRESSES
The majority of IPv6 addresses that we have collected so far belong
to servers or routers rather than clients. In this section, we use
crowdsourcing platforms to collect client IP addresses. Our aim
is to begin studying the following questions: Does crowdsourcing
serve as an adequate source of residential IPv6 addresses, and might
we be able to use addresses gathered through crowdsourcing in
IPv6 hitlists? We refer the reader to Section 10.1 describing the
ethical consideration of this study.
9.1 Experimental Setup
To investigate our approach of collecting IPv6 client addresses, we
use two crowdsourcing platforms and leverage the test-ipv6.com [26]
code to gather IPv6 addresses.
We set up a web server and integrate it into the crowdsourcing
environment to operate similarly to the study by Huz et al. [45].
We use Amazon Turk (Mturk) [8] and Prolific Academic (ProA) [60]
to run our experiments and allocate a budget of $150 per platform.
We add a limitation for only one submission per user per platform
and select the minimum amount of money that can be set for each
assignment: $0.01 for Mturk and $0.12 for ProA. We run the exper-
iment between April 23 and May 23, 2018. During this time, 5781
users participate from Mturk, compared to 1186 from ProA. We
make our setup and source code available to the community [49].
9.2 Crowdsourcing Participants
Table 9 shows the distribution of measurements per platform, in-
cluding AS [12] and country mappings [54]. We find about 31 %
of Mturk and 20.6 % of ProA users with IPv6 enabled. One reason
for Mturk’s higher IPv6 ratio might be their customer base: Mturk
is more popular in the US and India [45, 50], both countries with
considerable IPv6 adoption [41].
Moreover, 31.5 % of IPv6 ASes are overlapping between plat-
forms, although we do not find any common addresses.
A large part of our IPv6 clients participate from a small number
of ISPs. The top 3 ASes are Comcast (31.1 %) and AT&T (13.2 %),
and the Indian ISP Reliance (7.8 %). Comparing IPv6 clients with
IPv4 clients we find the latter to be more diverse, where the top 5
providers constitute only 30 % of all IPv4 clients in our dataset.
Table 9: Client distribution in crowdsourcing study.
IPv4 IPv6 ASes4 ASes6 #cc4 #cc6
Mturk 5707 1787 842 73 93 22
ProA 1176 245 272 48 33 21
Unique 6862 2032 983 92 98 29
9.3 Client Responsiveness
Once the user submits the results, we send an ICMPv6 echo request
and traceroute to each IPv6 address every 5 minutes.
We find that only 352 (17.3 %) of IPv6 addresses respond to at
least one ICMPv6 echo request. The majority of IPv6 addresses we
gathered from residential networks do not respond to these probes.
To investigate whether the low response rate was an artifact of
the devices (e.g., privacy extension address cycling, users discon-
necting), or network policy, we locate the set of RIPE Atlas probes
situated in the same ASes as our crowdsourced client addresses.
RIPE Atlas probes generally respond to echo requests they receive.
We select 1398 RIPE Atlas probes with IPv6 connectivity inside
these ASes and, having confirmed they were online, send tracer-
outes to those probes. As many as 641 (45.8 %) probes respond
to our queries. Since RIPE Atlas probes will respond by design,
these 45.8 % indicate an upper bound of possible crowdsourcing
responses. It is likely that users’ systems are running local firewalls
which will reduce the response rate further. This is indicative only,
and deserves further study.
We also find that for 20 % of clients, the last responsive hop is
different from the destination AS, which indicates filtering by ISPs.
The low responsiveness from the RIPE Atlas probes and crowd-
sourcing clients suggests inbound filtering. RFC 7084 [71] leaves
it open for the user to decide to either have an “outbound only”
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or an “open” configuration, allowing all internally and externally
initiated ICMPv6 connections for IPv6 CPEs. Future work is needed
to understand the reasons for the deployment of “outbound only”
policy for ICMPv6 in residential networks.
Client addresses that respond to our ICMPv6 requests are likely
to be less stable than server IP addresses. Only 7 IPv6 addresses
from the total of 352 responsive addresses remain active for the
entire month. 19 % of IPv6 addresses are active for less than an hour,
while 39.4 % of addresses are active for 8 hours or less. Moreover,
addresses with dynamic behavior i.e., appearing and disappearing
multiple times during the study, had a mean uptime of approxi-
mately 8 hours and median uptime of 3 hours per day.
We conclude that crowdsourced addresses provide additional
targets for IPv6 client studies. Only a fraction of them are, however,
responsive to incoming probes. Future work is needed to get more
representative data and to understand the extent to which filtering
is performed. Finally, active measurements targeting crowdsourcing
addresses need to be performed swiftly after address collection, as
the responsive client population is quickly shrinking.
10 MEASUREMENT PRACTICES
In our study we follow measurement best practices by conducting
scans in an ethical way and publishing data and code for repro-
ducibility in research.
10.1 Ethical Considerations
Before conducting active measurements we follow an internal multi-
party approval process, which incorporates proposals by Partridge
and Allman [57] and Dittrich et al. [23]. We assess whether our
measurements can induce harm on individuals in different stake-
holder groups. As we limit our query rate and use conforming
packets, it is unlikely that our measurements will cause problems
on scanned systems. We follow scanning best practices [24] by
maintaining a blacklist and using dedicated servers with informing
rDNS names, websites, and abuse contacts. During our six months
of active scans, we received four emails asking for more information
on the conducted measurements.
Prior to deploying the crowdsourcing study we discussed the
subject with the university ethics committee. We agreed with the
committee that IPv6 addresses collected in the crowdsourcing study
will be excluded from public datasets. In addition, we informed
participants that they could opt out of the active probing. The
ethics committee concluded that our experiments did not constitute
research on human subjects, as we have no reasonable way of
mapping collected IPv6 addresses to individuals, and gave the study
formal permission.
10.2 Reproducible Research
To encourage reproducibility in network measurement research
[1, 70], we make data, source code, and analysis tools publicly avail-
able [37]. This includes zesplot [43], entropy clustering [31], new
Entropy/IP generator [32], crowdsourcing documentation [49], and
results from daily runs of the IPv6 hitlist, including the list of aliased
prefixes [38]. Some of the figures in this paper are clickable, offering
additional insights, in-depth analyses, and interactive graphs. This
data can serve as a valuable starting point for future IPv6 studies.
11 DISCUSSION
In this section we summarize challenges in generating hitlists and
discuss lessons learned for future work.
Time-to-Measurement:We collect IPv6 addresses from a vari-
ety of sources containing server, router, and client addresses. Our
analysis shows that server IPv6 addresses are more responsive and
stable in comparison to CPE and client devices. As a result, when
using an IPv6 hitlist as an input for a specific measurement study, re-
searchers need to consider the time-to-measurement: client devices
need to be measured within minutes to obtain sensible response
rates, whereas servers remain responsive over weeks.
Hitlist Tailoring: To reduce bias when conducting IPv6 mea-
surements, we generally advise to strive for an evenly balanced
hitlist across prefixes and ASes, and to remove addresses in aliased
prefixes. Depending on the research goal, researchers can pivot
from an even address distribution to a stronger focus on certain
address types (e.g., HTTPS web servers). Depending on the type of
study it may also be desirable to include or exclude specific data
sources. For example, studies analyzing hosting providers can use
server addresses, while for residential networks, researchers can
focus on sources containing mainly CPE and client addresses.
Unresponsive Addresses:While our focus on responsive ad-
dresses is reasonable for a hitlist which is used as direct input for
a measurement study, there might be scenarios where also unre-
sponsive addresses could be of value. Unresponsive addresses can
be used to understand addressing schemes inside a prefix. They
can also be used as an input for address learning algorithms (e.g.,
Entropy/IP or 6Gen) which might then output responsive addresses.
IPv6Hitlist Service: In order to help future IPv6 measurements
we provide daily IPv6 hitlists and a list of aliased prefixes at:
https://ipv6hitlist.github.io
Providing an easy-to-use hitlist service has several advantages for
IPv6 research: (1) While conducting measurements on all known
IPv6 addresses is possible in one-off measurements, high-frequency
periodic measurements might require a focus on a subset of re-
sponsive addresses. We provide lists of responsive addresses which
can be directly used in IPv6 measurement studies. (2) With the
increasing adoption of IPv6, the number of all publicly known
IPv6 addresses is bound to increase as well, making it increasingly
challenging to perform a full sweep of all known addresses in the
future. (3) Reducing the number of measurement targets for the
multitude of IPv6 measurement studies is considered good Internet
citizenship [47]. (4) By providing historical data we enable other
researchers to study the evolution of IPv6 deployment.
12 CONCLUSION
In this work, we leveraged a multitude of sources to create the
largest IPv6 hitlist to date, containing more than 50M addresses. We
found that about half of these addresses reside in aliased prefixes
and showed, using clustering, that there are only six prevalent
IPv6 addressing schemes. Using longitudinal measurements we
identified protocols and sources which are less stable over time. We
used and extended state-of-the-art tools to generate new addresses,
finding that they provide complementary address sets. We will keep
running daily IPv6 measurements to provide valuable hitlists.
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